Intent Standard

The outcome, the policy, the hash

Two packages, intent-schema and IntentLib.sol, must agree byte-for-byte on how an outcome and a policy hash. If they disagree, settlement reverts with OutcomeMismatch.

Worked example

One playbook sentence, traced through the loop:

"put 5,000 USDT into NVDA and AAPL, 60/40, only attested assets"

IntentSpeckind: BASKET, in: 5000 USDT, out: [NVDA 60%, AAPL 40%], requireRwaAttested: true

IntentDraftNVDAx weightBps 6000, AAPLx weightBps 4000, amounts in wei

HashesoutcomeHash + policyHash committed on IntentRegistry

SettledWinner held to max(user minOut, bid guarantee) on every leg. Dust returned to owner.

Kinds

Kind	What it is
SWAP	One asset in → one asset out
BASKET	One asset in → weighted set out (xStocks portfolios)
REBALANCE	Exits → base → entries, one atomic tx
RWA_ONBOARD	Acquire an attested tokenized real-world asset
BATCH	Several of the above declared together
PAYMENT	1:1 stable send, including gasless USDG

Lifecycle

OPEN → SELECTED → FULFILLED

Side paths: CANCELLED, EXPIRED, or back to OPEN on failure or a dominance challenge.

An outcome is

Kind, input token/amount, recipient, slippage ceiling, acquisition legs (token, weightBps, minOut), exit legs (rebalance only).

A policy (v2) is

Spend cap, validity window, fee cap, reputation floor, requireRwaAttested, requireCompliant (KYB), sponsorGas, token allowlist. The registry stores hashes, never contents.

Contracts on X Layer 1952

Contract	Job	Address
IntentRegistry	Commit hashes, auction, select, gasless submitFor, session keys	0x8AA313ce51AdCC6c6B448Fd1fd0429dc24328eB6
IntentSettlement	Only contract that touches user funds	0x8CEC593527fB711205D3e656B1e277E35C793C9f
PolicyEngine	Guardrails	0xb59E325278F641847124A9F009b006713f7e1236
SolverRegistry	Bond, reputation, lanes, KYB	0xf46dCa275b0698f847f318DAc357A23540B44280
RWARegistry	Attestations and onboarding	0xBaF79Da5aE8c61EC95178B1c64d8280287553576
RecurringRegistry	Standing jobs the coordinator re-declares	0xF4e3018d883AAfA8541F1B722d392B14407d0AdC
RwaVault	1:1 TSLAx shares	0xA3741ff772A198c0374d37592931db33C5e6E096

Trust model

Layer	Trust
Mempool / draft	Untrusted. Wrong hash → unsettleable.
Solver	Untrusted. Bid is a promise the contract enforces.
Coordinator	Cannot steal funds; can pick a worse solver (slashable).
Settlement	The only trusted arithmetic.